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The application of fiscal decentralization reforms and demand for fiscal decentralization 
policy design has grown significantly in developed and developing countries in the past two 
decades.1 This wave of decentralization reforms is driven by diverse economic and political 
factors, from the pursuit of increased economic efficiency to the expansion of democratic 
governance (Shah and Thompson, 2002; Arzaghi and Henderson 2005). Despite being at the 
forefront of policy discussion of poor and rich countries alike, the empirical analysis of the 
impact of fiscal decentralization reforms is fairly new and our knowledge of many of these issues 
remains limited.2 
Researchers and policymakers alike have promoted decentralization reform agendas on 
the premise that decentralization results in a more efficient allocation of public goods by 
enabling local governments, which have better information, to tailor more closely their public 
spending decisions to the needs and preferences of their constituencies.  While there is a 
significant body of work on the theoretical underpinnings of the efficiency effects of fiscal 
decentralization (Oates, 1972; Mas-Colell, 1980), or more generally, of allocative efficiency 
under the analytical framework of effective federalism (Rubinfeld, 1987), there is a relative 
paucity of empirical evidence on this subject.   
 Empirical research on the hypothesized impact of decentralization on allocative 
efficiency has been handicapped by the complexity of generating standardized measurements of 
allocative efficiency across countries.  However, implicit in the argument that decentralization 
can increase allocative efficiency, is the implication that decentralization is likely to alter the 
                                                 
1 For reviews of the literature on the emergence of decentralization, see Shah (1994), Boadway et al. (1994), 
Dillinger (1994), Bird, Ebel, and Wallich (1995), Manor (1994), Campbell (2003),  Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 
(2003) and Oates (2004). 
2 See, for example, Shah (1997) and Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003). 
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composition of public expenditures. By comparison to using direct measures of allocative 
efficiency, examining the relationship between fiscal decentralization and composition of public 
expenditures is relatively straightforward.  
Several recent papers have examined the determinants of the composition of public 
expenditures (among others, Barro 1990, Devarajan and Swaroop, and Zou, 1996; and Sanz and 
Velasquez, 2004).  While this literature offers considerable insight on the composition of public 
expenditures, none of these studies has examined explicitly the potential influence of fiscal 
decentralization on expenditure composition and its link to allocative efficiency.  What evidence 
does exist on the role of decentralization is limited to country-specific analysis.3   
The main goal of this paper is to offer an indirect test of the allocative efficiency effects 
of decentralization by examining the role of decentralization on the composition of public 
expenditures.  First, we explore the theoretical linkages between decentralized governance and 
expenditure composition by means of a distance-sensitive representative agent model. Then we 
estimate the impact of fiscal decentralization on the level and functional composition of public 
expenditures using an unbalanced panel data set spanning 45 developed and developing 
economies over a period of 28 years.4  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents a review of the 
previous literature. Section three develops the theoretical model. Section four discusses the data 
and presents the estimation results. Section five concludes. 
 
                                                 
3 See Faguet (2000), for a case study of the impact of decentralization on expenditure composition in Bolivia. 
4  Our analysis focuses on the functional classification of public expenditures as opposed to economic or other types 
of classifications. The intergovernmental reform discourse tends to be overwhelmingly about the assignment of 
health, education, and other functional spending assignments, as opposed to how wage expenditures and the like 
should be distributed among different levels of government.  
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 2. Review of the Literature 
 Over the past decade a number of scholars and practitioners have examined the 
relationship between the composition of public expenditures and a variety of macroeconomic 
variables, including welfare and human capital, income inequality, macroeconomic stability, 
fiscal competition, and economic growth.5  Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) and Sanz and 
Velázquez (2004) provide two good examples of this literature. Examining the influence of 
expenditure composition on economic growth in developing countries, Devarajan et al. (1996) 
find that defense expenditures and infrastructure investments appear to negatively influence 
economic growth. Contemporaneous consumption-oriented public expenditures, on the other 
hand, appear to positively influence economic growth, suggesting that the developing countries 
in the sample could increase economic growth by reallocating resources from military and 
infrastructure expenditures to consumption-oriented expenditures.6  Sanz and Velázquez (2004) 
employ an augmented median voter model to study the determinants of expenditure composition 
at one single level of government in a panel of OECD countries.  They find that income, private-
public relative prices, institutional factors, and demographics significantly affect public 
expenditure composition. Another interesting recent study from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF, 2003) examines the impact of economic crises and fiscal deficits on social expenditures 
and social protection programs.  This study finds that IMF supported programs, which are 
typically implemented as a result of external shocks, do not adversely impact education and 
health expenditures.7  
                                                 
5  See, among others, Aschauer (1989, 1990), Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), Matovu (2000), and Gupta, Clements, 
Baldacci, and Mulas-Granados, 2002). 
6 However, the coefficients for health and education expenditures in this study are statistically insignificant. 
7 Snyder and Yackovlev (2000) argue that education and health expenditures are pro-cyclical in Latin America and 
counter-cyclical in the United States. 
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 But note that none of the above studies address the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
the composition of public expenditures. Faguet (2004), who examined the influence of fiscal 
decentralization on expenditure composition in Bolivia from 1991 to 1996, is the exception in 
the literature.  Faguet finds evidence that fiscal decentralization increases investment in socially-
oriented sectors, such as education, urban development, water and sanitation, and health care.8 
While Faguet’s results are suggestive of a relationship between fiscal decentralization 
and the functional composition of public expenditures, two tasks remain to be done. First, is to 
show that these results can be generalized and that they are not a reflection of a unique 
experience of a specific country. Second, is to develop a theoretical model to explain the 
channels through which fiscal decentralization may influence the composition of public 
expenditures. We endeavor to address these gaps in the literature in the following sections. 
3.  Modeling the Relationship between Decentralization and Expenditure Composition 
The model developed in this section stresses the heterogeneous nature of tastes among 
jurisdictions as a fundamental factor of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the 
composition of public expenditures. A main objective of the model is to account for the 
heterogeneity of individual preferences across local jurisdictions within a theoretical framework 
that focuses only on a “representative” median-voter. The heterogeneity of individual 
preferences has been largely ignored in representative-agent models and the application of this 
type of models to decentralization issues has drawn criticism in the literature.9  
                                                 
8 This pattern of decentralized expenditures concentrated on the provision of services related to poverty alleviation 
had been anticipated in the fiscal decentralization literature.  See, among others, Fox and Aranda, (1996) and Bird 
and Vaillancourt (1998). 
9 Fundamentally, decentralization would not make much sense if we assume that all individuals have identical 
preferences as it is often assumed in representative-agent models. See Kirman (1992) and Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab (2003). 
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Here we employ a distance-sensitive utility function which allows us to assume that all 
individuals have the same general utility but “each one of them” has a different preferred type of 
public good and also demands a different quantity of it.  Our modeling of heterogeneous 
preferences is further based on two additional assumptions: a) individuals are uniformly 
distributed along a country area, and b) individual utility accrued from any given public good is 
decreasing on distance to the middle of the country or jurisdiction that provides it.10  
Previous work by Alesina and Spolaore (1996), Alesina, Baquir, and Easterly (1996), and 
Panizza (1999) employed distance-sensitive utility functions with one public and one private 
good. In our model we extend the distance-sensitive representative agent model to an economy 
with two levels of government and two types of publicly provided goods.11   
In short, the model explicitly provides a link between the representative agent’s utility 
and the composition of national and subnational public expenditures. To get there we extend 
Alesina, Baquir, and Easterly’s (1996) result that the optimal amount of publicly provided goods 
is a function of the “median distance from the median” from a uni-dimensional to a multi-
dimensional voting model.  
We assume that individuals are uniformly distributed along a country with area A, 
population N, and J municipalities (where J > 1).  Each agent consumes three types of goods: 
one private good (C) and two publicly provided goods: S, a Samuelsonian pure public good 
(PPG) provided solely by the central government and G, a publicly provided private good 
(PPPG) whose provision is divided between the central government and local governments.  Per 
capita consumption of these goods is represented by c, s, and g, respectively.  We assume an 
exogenous level of centralization (θ) which is equal to the fraction of the PPPG provided by the 
                                                 
10 Below we elaborate further on the assumption of a uniform distribution of individuals.  
11  For space reasons we present only a stylized version of the model. The complete derivation of the model is 
available from the authors upon request.   
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central government.12  Education and national defense are examples of a PPPG and a PPG, 
respectively.13 
 We assume that each individual has a set of characteristics that determine their preferred 
type and quantity of the PPG and PPPG.14  The type and quantity of each public good are 
decided democratically by the median voter (med s, med g).  For this reason, it is possible that 
there may exist a separate “type median voter” and “quantity median voter” for each public 
good.  In order to ensure the median voter result given multidimensional voting, we must assume 
that: a) individuals vote on one issue at a time and b) individuals have separable preferences.15 
 We further assume that individuals are uniformly distributed, Tiebout-sorted, and pay a 
lump sum tax t on the same income y.16 Each type of PPG is located on an ideological Euclidean 
space that captures individual preferences and represents the area of the country.17  We assume 
that voter’s optima are evenly distributed over the space, that the number of voters is great 
enough so that the space can serve as a proxy for the voters, and the country size area is 
                                                 
12 We do not derive an optimal level of centralization. This would require the specification of a government 
objective function and the determinants of fiscal decentralization.  See Panizza (1999). 
13 There may disagreement with the choice of these two examples; we base our choice of education as a PPPG on 
previous studies that have shown education services subject to considerable “crowding.” 
14 We must differentiate between the two kinds of publicly provided goods and the many types of each good that can 
be provided. Education is a publicly provided good, which can be clearly categorized into different types based on 
the characteristics of the educational curriculum of schools. Some educational programs may impart certain religious 
beliefs and practices while others may be mainly focused on the development of the musical abilities of the students.  
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1996) present a model on which each jurisdiction decides on the type and quantity of a 
unique public good, the only difference here is that we assume the existence of more than one public good. 
15 Assumptions a and b are introduced to avoid issues of simultaneous multidimensional voting.  Enelow and Hinich 
(1984) prove that, under these assumptions, the outcome of majority voting is the optimum alternative of the median 
voter on each issue. We do not consider any distortions to the democratic process in this model. See Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (2000) for a theoretical model on capture of the democratic process at the local and national level and 
Panizza (1999) for discussion on the extent that a democratic system is offset by Leviathan local and central 
governments.  
16 Income distribution issues are assumed away, not because they are considered unimportant, but in order to isolate 
the locational efficiency effects of decentralized decision-making (Wildasin 1991, 1994). 
17 This is an extension of Alesina and Spalaore (1996) to a multidimensional problem. See Enelow and Hinich 
(1984) for further discussion of multidimensional voting. 
  7
normalized at one with no loss of generality.18  The distribution of individuals is such that each 
alternative can be uniquely mapped in the Euclidean Space.  
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where s, g, c, and θ are as defined previously; yic is individual i’s distance to the middle of the 
country measured on the PPG axis; xic is individual i’s distance to the middle of the country 
measured on the PPPG axis; and xij is individual i’s distance to the middle of the jurisdiction 
where he resides measured over the PPPG axis.  The parameter α, where 0≤ α ≤ 1, measures 
preference heterogeneity, that is as α approaches 0, preferences become relatively more 
homogenous.   
The public budget constraint is T = G + S, where T represents general (central plus 
subnational) tax revenue and pg and ps are normalized to one.19  The representative agent’s 
budget constraint before taxes is y = s + g + c or y = c + t.  Let δi = 1 - α (θ xic + (1-θ ) xij ) and 
γi = 1 - α yic , then the maximization of the individual’s utility function with respect to the budget 

















We can employ the Euclidean distance between two points to measure each individual’s 
distance between their preferred types of PPPGs and those actually provided.  Let || z – zm || = c 
                                                 
18 These assumptions have been used on several other studies that use a Euclidean space as an analytical tool for 
spatial analysis (Tullock, 1967; Plott, 1967; Davis, DeGroot, and  Hinich, 1971).  
19 It is important to note that this model is based on the maximization of individual utility by finding the optimal 
demand for public goods.  For this maximization problem the relevant constraint is individual after tax income. 
Individual after tax income is independent of the level of government providing the good and of the location of the 
individual.  This independence is guaranteed because all public goods in this model are financed through an income 
lump sump tax and because the assumption that all individuals have equal income.  Also note that we do not include 
any assumptions related to the production of public goods, such as costs differentials, or shared tax sources between 
levels of government.  See, among others, Nechyba (1997), Wrede (2000), and Caplan (2001), Faguet (2003).     
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be part of a circle on which each point z = (y1, x1) has a constant Euclidean distance to the point 
at which the type-median is located zm = (ym, xm).  As illustrated in Figure 1, for each individual 
located on the circle, there exists another individual with exactly the same horizontal and vertical 
distance to the center of the circle.  Individuals with same horizontal and vertical distances to the 
type-median will demand the same quantity of each good.20    
Given symmetric preferences, the quantity median voter is located at a distance equal to 
the ‘median distance to the median’ along the horizontal axis.  For a country with area A, the 
median distance to the median is Ax/4.  Let δk = 1 - α (θ xmkc + (1-θ ) xmkj ) > 0 and γk = 1 - α ykc 
> 0 , ymkc be the median distance to PPG type-median, xmkc be the median distance to the PPPG 
country type-median, and xmkj be the median distance to the PPPG jurisdiction type-median.  











ys *   
(3) 
 From (2) and (3), we develop four propositions which are tested empirically in the 
following section.  We summarize the decision-making mechanism for both type and quantity of 
both types of public goods in Appendix 1 and present, where applicable, the proofs of the 
propositions in Appendix 2.   
Propositions on Centralization and the Composition of Public Expenditure  
Given heterogeneous preferences, as the centralization level increases, the number of 
dissatisfied individuals with respect to the PPPG’s type increases accordingly.  All else being 
equal, demand for PPPG expenditure is inversely related to the level of centralization.  
                                                 
20 This is as opposed to individuals with same Euclidean distance to type median, who will not all demand the same 
quantity of public goods. In Figure 1 all points in the circle have the same Euclidean distance to the middle. 
However, just the pairs of points situated exactly in opposite sides of the circle have same horizontal and vertical 
distances to the middle.  
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Conversely, demand for PPG expenditure is positively related to the level of centralization as 
individuals substitute away from PPPGs towards the centrally provided PPG.  The following 
propositions summarize these results. 
Proposition 1:PPPG equilibrium quantity is decreasing in the centralization level, that is, 
 δg*k / δθ <0. 
 
Proposition 2:PPG equilibrium quantity is increasing in the centralization level, that is,  
δs*k / δθ >0. 
  
The intuition of Proposition 1 is simple.  In a more centralized country there will be more 
unhappy individuals with the chosen PPPG’s type. As a result, overall demand and support for 
this kind of expenditure will be smaller, other things equal, than in a more decentralized country. 
Given that PPGs are provided centrally, the quantity of each PPG will be decided by the 
country’s median voter.  The median voter’s decision on the provision of the PPG is inversely 
related to the median distance to the country median.  Likewise, a share of PPPG expenditure is 
provided by local governments and the quantity of each PPPG is decided by the median voter of 
each jurisdiction.  This decision is inversely related to the median distance to the jurisdiction 
median.  If more than one jurisdiction exists, the median distance to the country median is 
greater than the median distance to the jurisdiction median.  Thus, the more decentralized the 
provision of public goods, the higher the demand for PPPGs relative to PPGs.  As the level of 
decentralization increases, the provision of PPGs declines at a faster rate than the PPPGs 
increase, thus, the total level of public expenditure also declines. Intuitively, decentralized 
provision of public goods allows local governments to provide combinations of goods to each 
jurisdiction, as opposed to provide a whole package to all jurisdictions in the country like the 
  10
central government may be forced to do (due to lack of knowledge on local preferences or other 
constraints).21  The following propositions summarize these results. 
Proposition 3:PPPG share of total expenditure is decreasing in the centralization level, that is, 
δ(g/(g+s))/ δθ <0. 
 
Proposition 4:Total public expenditure is increasing in the centralization level, that is, 
δ(g+s)/ δθ >0. 
 
The interpretation of these results is again quite straightforward. First, the central 
government chooses the level of centralization for public good provision (exogenous in this 
model). Second, if the provision of the public good is centralized, the “type” will be decided by 
the preferences the overall median voter.  If, in contrast, the public good is provided by each 
jurisdiction, the “type” will be decided by the type-median voter of each locality. Once the type 
of each kind of public good is decided, individuals decide the quantity to be provided. 
Individuals demand more publicly provided goods the closer the type is to their individual 
preferences.   
Given the fact that pure public goods in our model are provided centrally, the quantity of 
such goods will be decided by the overall median voter. This decision is inversely related to the 
‘median distance to the country median’. Conversely, a share of the PPPG expenditures in our 
model is provided by the local government.  The quantity of PPPG is decided by the jurisdiction 
median voter. This decision is inversely related to the median distance to the jurisdiction median. 
In countries with more than just one jurisdiction, the median distance to the country median is 
higher than ‘the median distance to the jurisdiction median’. This determines that the more 
decentralized is the provision of public goods the higher the demand for publicly provided 
                                                 
21 Note that it may be possible got the central government to provide different packages of PPPGs to different 
jurisdictions. For example, Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) present models where the central 
authorities are able to discriminate among jurisdictions with different packages of services. In this paper we keep the 
conventional assumption that central provision is homogenous for all jurisdictions.  
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private goods as opposed to pure public goods.  In other words, given the distribution of 
preferences, the more centralized the provision of goods the lower the ratio of publicly provided 
private goods to total amount of public goods provided. 22 
Intuitively, Proposition 4 suggests that decentralized provision of public goods allows 
local government to provide specifics goods or combinations of goods to each jurisdiction as 
opposed to the need of providing a whole package to all jurisdictions in the country, as the 
central government may be forced to do due to lack of knowledge on local preferences or 
otherwise (political) inability to discriminate among jurisdictions.23  This specialization of public 
good provision implies a potentially lower level of total expenditures. Proposition 4 is also in 
line with several hypothesis in the decentralization literature. Alternative explanations include: a) 
decentralization can lead to lower expenditures due a reduction in redistribution expenditures due 
to Tiebout sorting, which would imply income-homogeneous jurisdictions; this is an argument 
originally made by Musgrave (Oates, 1985); or b) decentralization constitutes a disciplining 
force that provides a closer link between revenues and spending, as in Brennan and Buchanan’s 
Leviathan Hypothesis (1980). What is novel in our result in Proposition 4 is that the shrinking 
effect of decentralization on overall public expenditures does not depend on fiscal competition, 
as in Brennan and Buchanan, or on the reduction of redistributional expenditures as noted by 
Musgrave. However, our results presupposes some sort of Tiebout sorting and the inability of the 
central government to offer different packages, or discriminate, across local jurisdictions. 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
We now turn to examining whether empirical support exists for our theoretical model. In 
this section we focus on testing the empirical validity of Proposition 3 on the relationship 
                                                 
22 Given our assumption of the spatial distribution of individuals on the country and the correspondence of location 
and preferences. 
23 But see footnote 21 above. 
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between decentralization and expenditure composition.24  As in the case of several more recent 
studies of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, we employ a 
panel data set of developed and developing countries.25   
The Data 
 One common difficulty faced in the cross-country study of fiscal decentralization is how 
to properly measure the extent of decentralization.  Ideally, we would construct a panel data set 
of measures of fiscal decentralization that effectively quantified the activities of subnational 
governments resulting from their autonomous or independent decisions.  This would require 
classifying those expenditures that are under the effective control of the central government as 
central government activities, regardless of the level of government at which these expenditures 
occurred.  Likewise, activities that were under the control of subnational governments, even if 
they were funded by the central government, would be classified as subnational government 
activities.  Constructing such a panel data set of measures of the decentralization of expenditures 
would require information on the overall level of political, administrative and fiscal autonomy of 
subnational governments (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003). Unfortunately, we cannot 
readily address these issues with the available data.  We are, as Oates (1972) concluded, left with 
the standard, albeit imperfect, measure of fiscal decentralization based on expenditure data. We 
define fiscal decentralization as the share of subnational government expenditures to general 
government expenditures.26 We employ the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance 
                                                 
24 Testing the effects of decentralization on the equilibrium quantities of PPPG and PPG  in Propositions 1 and 2 
will involve very different data sets and will be perform in future research. On the other hand, the equivalent of 
Proposition 4 has been tested in many different occasions in the empirical public finance literature, especially in the 
case of the Leviathan model, with mixed results. See, for example, Oates (1985, 1989).  
25 See Davoodi and Zou (1998) and Woller and Phillips (1998), and Treisman (2000).  See also Hsiao (1986) and 
Baltagi (1995) for a discussion of the advantages and problems associated with the use of panel data. 
26 See Bird (2000) and Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) for a discussion of the pitfalls associated with the conventional 
measurement of fiscal decentralization.  The OECD dataset suggested by Ebel & Yilmaz, however, includes only 
data for six countries on a period of only three years (1997-1999).  While some studies of fiscal decentralization 
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Statistics Annual Yearbook (GFS) as the primary data source for expenditures of national and 
subnational governments.27  
Combining the GFS data with the data extracted from the other data sources reduced the 
size of the data set from approximately 1,000 observations to approximately 600 observations 
due to missing observations for some control variables in the World Development Indicators 
2002 dataset.  The final panel dataset covers 45 countries from 1973-2000.  Table 1 defines the 
variables used in the empirical model and their sources. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of 
these variables. The control variables used in the econometric model are discussed below.  
To test the propositions developed in the preceeding section, we need to classify observed 
public expenditures as either coming from pure public goods or from publicly provided private 
goods.  We simplify this task by focusing on the identification of  two public services as publicly 
provided private goods: education and health. Together these two services tend to represent a 
large share of decentralized expenditures in most countries. A standard technique to identify the 
degree of publicness of government services, used in studies related to the determinants of public 
expenditures and the demand for public goods, is the calculation of a crowding parameter.28  
Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Oxley and Martin (1991), and Saunders (1993) have all argued 
that health and education expenditures should be classified as publicly provided private goods, 
subject to specific caveats on the measurement of the crowding parameter.  
                                                                                                                                                             
have attempted to construct measures of decentralization net of grants and transfers and net of certain types of 
expenditures, we do not construct such measures, as we are not able to ascertain, with any degree of certainty, 
whether these techniques reduce or enhance the bias already present in our measures of fiscal decentralization.  See, 
for example, Woller and Phillips (1998) and Lin and Liu (2000). 
27 We use GFS data at the consolidated central government, regional and state government, and local government 
levels. For those countries that do not report consolidated central government data, we substitute data on the 
budgetary central government.  Of the 180-plus potential countries in the GFS data set, we selected countries that 
reported expenditures for at least the central government and at least one level of subnational government. We did 
not include those countries that stopped reporting expenditure information prior to 1990 and those countries whose 
reported data were mathematically inconsistent.  We did include countries that reported zero or minimal 
expenditures for at least one subnational level of government. 
28 See, for example, Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982), Martinez-Vazquez (1982), or 
Blecha (1987). 
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 While we cannot provide empirical evidence at this juncture on the degree of crowding 
for education and health services in the sample countries, we believe that is relatively safe to 
assume that these two types of services generally do not exhibit the characteristics of non-
excludability and non-rivalry of pure public goods.  Burki, Perry, and Dillinger (1999), for 
example, note that immunization, sanitation, other public health services are non-exclusive but 
rival; while services of acute health care are clearly rival and exclusive. Similarly, classroom size 
limitations and number of teachers per student in most of the developing countries clearly add 
some degree of rivalry to education services.   
Model Specification and Econometric Issues 
We now turn to the empirical examination of the theoretical propositions developed in 
the previous section.  The dependent variable, Comp, is defined as the ratio of education and 
health expenditures to total public expenditures. Thus, the empirical statement of Proposition 3 
in the previous section, is that, all other things equal, more decentralized countries spend a higher 
share of their expenditures on education and health. In terms of the explanatory variables in the 
model, our main interest is on decentralization, Dec, which is measured as the share of 
subnational expenditures in total public expenditures. A matrix X of control variables, includes 
population, population density, GDP per capita, and budget balance. We allow for potential 
differences in the impact of decentralization on expenditure composition in developing and 
developed countries by introducing an interaction term, dev, between our decentalization 
measure and a dummy variable to capture industralized country status. We can specify the 
general estimation form as: 
)( ,3,2,10, tiiitititi uadevXDecGComp +++++= αααα , (4) 
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where G(·) is a transformation function we apply due to the fractional nature of the dependent 
variable (discussed below), and where ai denotes the unobserved country effect.29 The subscripts 
i and t denote country and time period, respectively.  
The general estimable form in (4) precludes the use of several time-invariant variables 
that have been previously used in the literature, if a fixed effects estimation is employed.  
Variables such as ethnic fractionalization, country size, colonial tradition, legal tradition, and 
religious dominance are all ‘swept’ by the Within transformation of the fixed effects estimator.30   
The transformation function G(·) in (4) is implemented because the dependent variable is 
a fractional variable constrained on the unit interval [0,1] and it may not offer sufficient variation 
for estimation by OLS (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996).  Interpretation problems may arise as 
there is no guarantee that the predicted value of the dependent variable lies on the unit interval, 
so the estimated coefficients may account for more than can be rationally interpreted.  Typically 
the literature had dealt with this issue with a logistic transformation, however, Papke and 
Wooldridge note that there are computation limitations on obtaining the true predicted value 
from the logistic transformation and suggest the use of a quasi-maxmimum likelihood estimator 
                                                 
29 The unobserved effects can be thought of as omitted variables that are constant within a group. Equation (4) is 
also referred as a one-way error component model, because it does no include a time specific effect tγ , often used in 
panel data models (two-way error component models). We do not explicitly include the time specific effect variable 
in the model for simplicity.  However, since the number of periods is fairly small we remedy this by adding a set of 
time specific dummy variables to all the models. 
30 We were unable to collect panel data for many countries on population age structure. This variable is used, for 
example, by Sanz and Velázquez (2004). We are not certain of what effects that may have in our estimates, but for 
example Poterba, (1996) and Fernandez, and Rogerson (1997) find no or little effect of population age structure on 
education spending. In addition, we are able to control for corruption, which may have an impact also on 
expenditure composition (Mauro, 1998). In this case the problem has to do with the nature of available data on 
corruption. For example, in the case of Transparency International (2004) Corruption Perceptions Index, year-to-
year changes in a country's score result can be simply due a changing sample and methodology rather than the 
underlying corruption. This same problem is also addressed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005) for other 
corruption measures. An alternative choice for us would have been to modify our estimation approach from panel to 
cross-sectional analysis. We decided against it because of the significant loss in degrees of freedom. We should note 
that the level of country corruption is captured, especially to the extent that corruption does not change significantly 
over time, by the fixed effect component of our model. 
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(QMLE) to guaruntee that the predicted values of the dependent variable lie on the unit 
interval.31   
As our sample period spans 27 years, we suspect a priori that serial correlation may be a 
problem.32  In order to test for serial correlation we employed the modified Durbin Watson 
Statistic based on the within residuals rather than the OLS residuals, as suggested by Bhargava, 
Franzini, and Narendranathan (1982).33 
 In what follows we present five alternative econometric models to estimate the general 
specification in equation (4), which allows us to test for the robustness of our results concerning 
the impact of decentralization on expenditure composition. The first model employs an OLS 
estimator and first differenced data. The second and third models employ the Cochrane-Orcutt 
(1949) transformation for unbalanced panel data (Baltagi 1995), and differ only in the use of the 
within or random effects GLS estimator.34  The fourth model is the QMLE suggested by Papke 
and Wooldridge, with fixed country and time specific effects.  The fifth model is a least-squares 
dummy variable model.  We correct the standard errors in all the estimated models through the 
use of the White (1980) variance-covarariance matrix estimator. Table 3 summarizes the 
econometric approches used on each of the five models estimated.   
                                                 
31 As the QMLE estimation is based on the maximization of a Bernoulli log likelihood function on the basis of the 
distribution of E(y|x) = G(xβ), where G is the logistic transform that satisfies 0 < G < 1, the predicted values are 
guaranteed to lie on the unit interval. 
32 See Table A2 in the Appendix section for a summary of countries and years covered. 
33 See also Baltagi (1995). For the two-way fixed effects error components estimation, the estimated Durbin-Watson 
statistic is 0.73 with an estimated autoregressive parameter of 0.79. 
34 Models 2 and 3 are based on the linear regression of the transformed model: 
titi uxy ,, ++= &&&& βα , where 
yyy itti θ−=,&& , xxx titi θ−= ,,&& .  For the fixed effects model, 1=θ , this transforms the data to variations of the mean 
over time within each cross sectional group. For the Random effects, { } 2122 )]ˆ/ˆ(1/[11ˆ uaT σσθ +−= , where a2σˆ  and 
u
2σˆ  are estimators of a2σ  and u2σ based on the pooled OLS or the fixed effects residuals.  After the C-O 
transformation: 
tititititi XXyy ,1,,1,, )ˆ()ˆ1(ˆ ηρβραρ &&&&&&&&&& +−+−=− −− , where the autocorrelation parameter comes from 
tititi ,1,, ηερε &&&&&& += − . 
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The fourth model using QMLE requires a bit more explanation. Here we control for serial 
correlation by correcting the estimated variance-covariance matrix as opposed to transforming 
the data through first differencing or a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation. Using the variance-
covariance matrix is desirable for us because we are interested in examining a proposition in 
levels while the first differencing transformation would have changed the question under 
consideration to one of change-on-change.  With respect to the fixed effects, the literature 
supports the argument that fully robust estimators work reasonably well even when the cross-
sectional sample size is not especially large relative to the time series dimension (Wooldridge 
2002, 2003).  Given the relatively small number of groups in our sample (N=45), the 
inconvenience of using a set of country dummies in order to control for unobserved country 
effects is not as great compared to the existing alternatives.35 
We must also note that the QMLE marginal effects are non-linear functions of the 
estimated coefficients and the specific values of the explanatory variables.  Given the logistic 
density function g(z) = δG(z) / δz = exp(z)/(1+exp(z)]2, the QMLE marginal effects are equal to 
δE(y|x)/δxj = mj = g(xβ)βj .  We can calculate the marginal effects using the mean values of the 
explanatory variables where the linear prediction is β)x  = -1.1845, and the density for the 
logistic distribution is =)( β)xg .1794.   
Returning now  to all five estimating models, we use Likelihood Ratio and F tests to 
examine if the country and time-specific effects are jointly equal to zero and in all cases we are 
unable to reject the null hypothesis that the effects are jointly equal to zero.  We thus include 
                                                 
35 In contrast to the within and random estimation methods for linear models, the literature on fixed and random 
effects for nonlinear models is limited. One theoretical approach to control for unobserved effects in nonlinear 
models is to maximize a conditional likelihood, for which the unobserved effects are integrated out. This is done 
through a conditional joint distribution (Hausman, Griliches, and Hall, 1993; Greene, 2001, 2002; Wooldridge, 
2002).  But despite these computational advances, in most models it is not always possible to remove the 
unobserved effects from the density, especially in estimations with continuous dependent variables.   
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country and time specific effects in each of the estimated models.  While first differencing 
removes the country specific effects from the first model, the other models are two-way error 
component estimators.  Therefore, for models 2 to 5 we test whether the explanatory variables 
and individual effects are correlated using a modified Hausman (1978) test to ascertain whether 
we should employ the Within or random effects GLS estimator.  We reject the null hypothesis of 
no correlation in all cases.  
Estimation Results 
The estimation results for the five models are presented in Table 4.  The most important 
result, for our interest, is that obtained for the fiscal decentralization variable (Dec).  The 
coefficient Decβ  is positive and highly statistically significant in all models. As discussed 
previously, due to the fractional nature of the dependent variable, model 4 provides the estimated 
coefficients and the marginal effects, the latter being more appropriate for interpreting the 
results.  The magnitude of the Dec marginal effect ranges from =Decmˆ  0.24  to =Decβˆ  0.38. 
Thus the QMLE model predicts an increase of 2.4 percentage points in the composition of 
expenditures variable when the level of decentralization increases from Dec=0.26 (the mean 
value) to Dec=0.36. This is significantly lower than the 3.8 percentage point increase predicted 
by the least-squares dummy variable (the closest in methodology employed for other 
econometric issues) and still lower than the 3.1 and 2.9 percentage points increase predicted by 
the within and random effects error components specifications, respectively.36 
The marginal effects of the MQLE are defined as: jjj xgmxxyE ββ )(/)( ==∂∂ , where 
dzzdGzg /)()( =  /)exp(z=  2)]exp(1[ z+ . Since 0)( →zg as ∞→z , the marginal effects 
                                                 
36 As expected, due the serial correlation problem, the standard errors of the QMLE that were not corrected for 
positive serial correlation are underestimated, leading to higher z-statistics.  The values of z statistics for the serial 
correlation-robust variance covariance matrix and the white robust z statistics are also reported in Table 4.   
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decrease as the values of the explanatory variables get larger.  In order to find the marginal 
effects, we must choose values for the explanatory variables to estimate a scalar value for )( βxg , 
which then is multiplied to each variables coefficient.  For this, we chose the mean values of the 
explanatory variables, as reported in the descriptive statistics (Table 2). With the mean values of 
the explanatory variables the linear prediction is β)x  = -1.1845, and =)( β)xg .1794. We examine 
the non-linear nature of the estimated marginal effects of the decentralization variable; this is 
done by maintaining the mean for control variables and while estimating the marginal effects for 
alternative degrees of decentralization.  In order to evaluate the marginal effects for higher 
values of decentralization, we add a standard deviation to the mean value of the DEC variable 
(DEC =.259+.152 ≈.41).  Similarly, to evaluate the marginal effects at lower values of 
decentralization we subtract a standard deviation to the mean value of the decentralization 
variable (DEC =.259-.152 ≈.11). The scalar )( β)xg calculated at DEC=.11 is lower than the one 
calculated at the mean (DEC=.26). For DEC=.11 the linear prediction scalar is β)x  = -1.3874, 
and =)ˆ( βxg .1599.  In a similar way, the marginal effects for DEC=.41 are higher than those 
calculated at the mean.  For DEC=41 the linear prediction scalar is β)x  = -.9872, and 
=)ˆ( βxg .1978.37  Table 5 summarizes these results. Summarizing, the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on the composition of expenditures increases with higher values of 
decentralization.38 
                                                 
37 The scalar values used )ˆ( βxg in each case can be easily verified by multiplying any variable’s coefficient by the 
reported )ˆ( βxg then compare this value to the marginal effects listed on table 4 for that variable. For more details in 
the derivation of marginal effects see appendix J and K. 
38 These may seem contradictory with the fact that the MQLE marginal effects are decreasing on the chosen values 
of the explanatory variables since 0)( →zg as ∞→z .  Where dzzdGzg /)()( =  /)exp(z=  
2)]exp(1[ z+ .  However, it is important to note that g(z) is increasing for negative values of z until it reaches a 
maximum at z=0.    
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Let us now turn to the other explanatory variables. The parameter for the interaction term 
for fiscal decentralization and industrial country status is negative and weakly significant in the 
QMLE model and negative and statistically significant in model one, suggesting that 
decentralization’s influence on expenditure composition may be attenuated in industrialized 
countries.   
The coefficient for GDP per capita is negative and statistically significant at the one 
percent level in the QMLE and mostly negative but although not statistically significant in the 
other models. This result may be due to the impact of private education and health services on 
the growth of public education and health services as a country’s per capita income increases. 39 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the budget balance in the QMLE 
and other three models suggests that education and health expenditures are vulnerable to cuts in 
times of economic crisis (Snyder and Yackovlev, 2000 and IMF 2003).  Using the marginal 
effect for the QMLE model, a one percent decrease in the budget balance would lower health and 
education expenditures as percentage of total expenditures by 0.10 percent.  The marginal effects 
for the first difference and error components specifications models yield similar results.  Health 
and education expenditures would appear to fall at a greater rate than other components of total 
expenditures in times of economic turmoil.    
The parameter estimate for population is negative and statistically significant for the 
QMLE model and three other models. This suggests that there may be a greater ‘fixed cost 
effect’ in the provision of education and health services vis-à-vis other public expenditures..40 
                                                 
39 There is some evidence that public health and education services may have lower income elasticity than other 
public expenditures (see Bahl et al., 2002). 
40 There is empirical evidence that population tends to be negatively correlated per capita expenditures for most 
public services. See Murdoch and Sandler (1984), Gertham, Jonsson and Anderson  (1992), Falch and Rattso (1999), 
Marlov and Shiers (1999), Snyder and Yackovelev (2000).   
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The parameter estimates for population density is generally statistically insignificant, including 
the that for the QMLE model.  
In summary, we find robust statistical evidence from cross country panel data that 
decentralization affects the composition of public expenditures increasing the share of publicly 
provided private goods, as captured by public education and health. These results offer strong 
support to our theoretical model.  
5. Conclusion  
This paper set out to offer an indirect test of the allocative efficiency effects of 
decentralization by examining the role of decentralization on the composition of public 
expenditures.  We investigate this issue from a theoretical viewpoint by by means of a distance-
sensitive representative agent model. By employing a two-dimensional space country framework we 
are able to integrate two features of fiscal decentralization: the distribution of expenditure 
assignments between two levels of government and the composition of public expenditures into 
two types of public goods.  The approach allows us to represent the heterogeneous nature of 
tastes within a representative agent model. Among other implications of the model, we finds that 
decentralization leads to higher levels of publicly provided private goods and to a higher share of 
publicly provided private goods in total government expenditures.  The model predictions are 
strongly supported by our empirical analysis based an unbalanced panel data set spanning 45 
developed and developing economies over a period of 28 years.   
The policy implications of our findings are intriguing.  Decentralization trends all over 
the world are likely to result in a reallocation of resources in the public sectors from centrally 
provided PPGs to subnationally provided PPPGs. This higher emphasis on expenditures on 
  22
education and health may not only yield increases in allocative efficiency and overall welfare, 




Description of Variables 
Variable Label Definition Units Source 
Expenditure 















Budget Deficit BUD 
Current and capital revenue 
and official grants received 
less total expenditure and 
lending minus repayments as 





Population POP Total country population 10 millions 
World Bank 
Indicators (2002) 
Density DENS Total population divided by land area in square kilometers Thousands 
World Bank 
Indicators (2002) 
Per Capita GDP GDPPC 
Gross Domestic Product 












DEV DEC x Industrial Dummy (=1 for industrialized countries) (0-1)/0 
Calculated from 
GFS & WBI 
(2002) 







Series N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Expenditure composition  614 .235 .072 .086 .538 
Fiscal Decentralization 614 .259 .152 .017 .591 
Budget Deficit 614 -.027 .039 -.267 .090 
Population 614 .573 1.526 .002 9.624 
Density 614 .101 .107 .001 .579 
Per Capita GDP 614 .132 .122 .002 .456 





Summary of corrections and specification modeling of econometric issues. 
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lie on the unit 
interval 
)()( βxGxyE =   
where )(⋅G  is 
the logistic 
transformation 
0 < G < 1. 
Not 
guaranteed to 





Estimated Coefficients Composition of Public Expenditures 
Dependent Variable: Expenditures in health and education services as a % of  
















































































































(9.65) no const. no const. no const. 
R2 .23 .37 .24 .88 .89 
Number of 
Observations  568 568 568 614 614 
The quantities in (.) are the White corrected t-statistics for the OLS, and z for the QMLE; the 
quantities in [.] are the White corrected t-statistics robust to variance misspecification for the OLS, 
and the White corrected z-statistics robust to variance misspecification for the QMLE.  Serial 





Quasi maximum Likelihood 
Marginal effects and elasticities Composition of Public Expenditures (Model 4) 
Dependent Variable: Expenditures in health and education services as a % of  







at mean values x  
at mean values 
x , Dec=.11 
at mean values x , 
Dec=.41 
Fiscal Decentralization 1.334**(.2734) 




      .2134** 
(.0384) 
      .2639** 
(.0590) 
Interaction Term 
(Dec * Ind.  Dummy) 
-.1778+ 
(.1026) 




      -.0284+ 
(.0164) 
      -.0352+ 
(.0204) 
GDP Per Capita -4.0075**(.4603) 




      -.6410** 
(.0681) 
      -.7928** 
(.0987) 
Budget Balance .5846* (.2451) 




      .0935* 
(.0397) 
       .1157* 
(.0482) 














     -.0264** 
(.0070) 
       -.0327** 
(.0085) 
The quantities in (.) are the white corrected standard errors. **,*,+ denote significance at the 1%,5%, 
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Table A.1  
Deciding the Type and the Quantity of Public Goods 
Decision Type Quantity 
Who is the key 
decision maker? 
Where is the 
location of the key 
decision maker? 
Who is the key 
decision maker? 
Where is the 
location of the key 
decision maker? 
Pure Public Goods 
Type national 
median voter 





Determined by the 
distance to the 
national median 
(vertical axis).  
Median distance to 
the country median 
(vertical axis). 
Share  θ Type national median voter 




median voter.  
Determined by the 
distance to the 
country median 
(horizontal axis). 
Median distance to 
the country median 
(horizontal axis). 
PPPG’s 
Share (1-θ) Type jurisdiction median voter 





Determined by the 
distance to the 
middle of the 
jurisdiction 
(horizontal  axis).  
Median distance to 
the jurisdiction 






























−++= yy  (5) 
If J > 1, then δθ = -α( xic - xij ) < 0  
 and θ∂
∂ *ig < 0 
(6) 






∂ ys  (7) 
given that 0<θδ ⇒ θ∂
∂ s > 0.  
 Proof of Proposition 3 
Given normalized prices total expenditures must decrease, and the ratio PPPG to total 
expenditures must necessarily increase with decentralization. Taking the first derivative of the 























−−+= θθθθ   
Since gθ < 0, sθ >0, (gθs - gsθ )<0 (g + s)2 > 0  which implies θ∂








+∂ sg > 0.     (8) 
Given propositions 1 and 2, θ∂
∂ ig < 0, θ∂
∂ s > 0, the sign of equation 8 is positive if θθ ∂
∂<∂
∂ sgi . 
Rewriting equation (7) in terms of θ∂
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c ; rearranging equation (9):  θθ ∂
∂−=+∂
∂ gcs  or  
θθ ∂
∂=−∂
∂ scgi , given equation (6), 0<θδ  ⇒  c < 0 hence θθ ∂
∂<∂




Available Decentralization Data: Government Finance Statistics (1972-2000) 
Country Years Country Years 
Albania 1995-1998 Latvia 1996-2000 
Argentina 1978-2000 Lithuania 1991-2000 
Australia 1972-1999 Luxembourg 1972-1997 
Austria 1972-2001 Malaysia 1972-1987 
Azerbaijan 1993-2000 Mauritius 1972-2000 
Bahrain 1972-2000 Mexico 1972-1999 
Belgium 1972-1998 Moldova 1995-2001 
Belarus 1992-2000 Mongolia 1992-2000 
Bolivia 1985-2000 Netherlands 1973-1997 
Brazil 1980-1998 New Zealand 1972-2000 
Bulgaria 1993-2000 Norway 1972-1998 
Canada  1974-2000 Panama 1973-1999 
Chile 1972-2000 Peru 1972-2000 
Costa Rica 1972-2000 Paraguay 1972-1993 
Czech Republic 1993-2000 Philippines 1972-2000 
Croatia 1993-2000 Poland 1984-2000 
Denmark 1972-2000 Portugal 1973-1998 
Dominican Republic 1972-1999 Rumania 1972-1999 
Estonia 1991-2000 Russian Federation 1994-2000 
Fiji 1972-1996 Senegal 1972-2000 
Finland 1972-1998 Slovak Republic 1996-2000 
France 1972-1997 Slovenia 1992-2001 
Georgia 1997-2000 South Africa 1972-2000 
Germany 1972-1999 Spain 1972-1997 
Hungary 1981-2000 Sweden 1972-1999 
Iceland 1972-1998 Switzerland 1972-1999 
India 1974-2000 Tajikistan 1998-2000 
Indonesia 1972-1999 Thailand 1972-2000 
Ireland 1972-1997 Tunisia 1972-2000 
Israel 1972-2000 Ukraine 1999-2000 
Italy 1973-1999 United Kingdom 1972-1999 
Kazakhstan 1997-2000 USA 1972-2000 
Kenya 1972-1998 Uruguay 1972-2000 
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